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This thesis explores the role and nature of intuition in philosophical inquiry. Appeals to intuition 
have either been used as evidence for or against philosophical theories or as constitutive features 
of judgement. I attempt to understand our uses of intuition by appealing to tacit knowledge. The 
hope is to elicit a picture of intuition as being practical and explanatory. Our reliance on intuition 
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Intuition Skepticism: The Restrictionist Challenge 
It is widely held amongst philosophers that their practice makes use of appeals to intuition. 
Numerous examples abound: Gettier cases in epistemology, trolley problems in ethics, the 
Chinese room argument in the philosophy of mind, and the list goes on. Clearly, intuitions have a 
significant role in contemporary philosophy. But what exact role do they play? And what role 
ought they play? In part, these questions depend on what intuitions are, and what philosophical 
inquiry aims to achieve.  
 Though there is no consensus concerning the role and nature of intuitions, nor an 
agreement concerning the aims of philosophical inquiry, there is a worry that shadows these 
uncertainties. In the field of experimental philosophy, philosophers conducted a series of 
experiments about our intuitions and what they tell us (in the hope of learning more about their 
role and nature). The results were surprising. The first set of findings present our intuitions as 
diverse. In a study conducted by Jonathan Weinberg, Stephen Stitch, and Shaun Nichols (2001), 
the authors advance the claim that our intuitions are sensitive to our cultural background.1 
Intuitions vary across cultures. The second set of findings present our intuitions as sensitive. 
Intuitions vary not only across cultures but within cultures. People who share the same cultural 
background have intuitions that are at odds with one another. In addition, our intuitions also vary 
at the individual level – i.e. within the subject. Our intuitions may change over time given our 
                                                
1 In one example, they ask participants from Western and Eastern backgrounds what their intuitions are surrounding 
a case of whether an agent, Bob, knows or merely believes that his friend, Jill, drives an American car. They found 
that 26% of Western subjects judge that Bob knows while 56% of Eastern subjects judge that Bob knows.  
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exposure to certain content,2 the way in which the content is presented,3 and our relation to said 
content.4  
 Of course our intuitions are diverse and sensitive to various factors. In fact, we want them 
to be. However, what the experimental philosophers show is something more serious than simple 
diversity and sensitivity. Their experiments demonstrate that our intuitions appear to be 
influenced by factors irrelevant to the situation that matters. We want our intuitions to track the 
salient features of a case. But if philosophical inquiry employs intuitions and our intuitions 
appear to be sensitive to irrelevant factors, we need a way of understanding intuition’s proper 
place in philosophy. Call this the restrictionist challenge. Joshua Alexander states: 
The real challenge lies not just in the fact that intuitions are not wholly reliable, but also 
in the fact that we know so little about them. We lack the resources needed to explain 
problematic intuitional sensitivity and, in return, struggle to understand its dimensions, to 
identify strategies for how to compensate for it, and to predict where it will appear. What 
is really needed, then, is a general, systematic understanding of philosophical intuitions. 
By coming to better understand what intuitions are, where they come from, and what 
factors influence them, we can better understand what role they play in philosophical 
practice. (2012, 71-72) 
 
Aims 
In part, this thesis is a response to the restrictionist challenge. By exploring the nature of both 
intuition and philosophical inquiry, I aim to provide a satisfactory account of the role intuition 
plays in philosophy. In particular, I argue that intuition is an expression of tacit knowledge. 
Contemporary philosophical practice treats our intuitions as evidence – e.g. for or against a 
theory, a claim, a way of thinking, and so on. By defending the claim that intuition is an 
                                                
2 Nichols and Knobe (2007) provide a case study that reveals our intuitions are sensitive to the presence or absence 
of affective content. 
3 Sinnott-Armstrong (2008) discusses how framing effects can alter our intuitions. 
4 Timm (2016) presents a study in which our practices of eating meat shape our intuitions and attitudes toward 
animals. 
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expression that relies on tacit knowledge – i.e. a claim concerning its nature – I argue that 
intuition’s primary role is to understand or apprehend the salient features of a case – in the form 
of a judgement – and a secondary (indirect) role as evidence for or against philosophical theories. 
The idea is to suggest that intuition as an expression of tacit knowledge can equip us with a 
framework that deals with the issues posed by the restrictionist challenge.  
 
Structure 
The thesis is divided into three chapters. Chapter I explores three themes. The first theme 
concerns how contemporary philosophers view intuition – i.e. its nature. The second theme 
concerns the aims of philosophical inquiry – i.e. what philosophers take the task of philosophy to 
be. The third theme concerns the role they think intuition should have in philosophical inquiry 
given what they take the nature of intuition to be in light of their view of philosophy’s aims. In 
particular, this chapter characterizes the role intuition has as evidence for or against 
philosophical theories.  
 Chapter II develops an alternative account of intuition that figures prominently in 
domains such as moral philosophy and the educational context. In particular, I describe an 
account of intuition as being an essential feature of judgement. In contrast to the role intuition 
has in Chapter I, here the role is described as knowledge about what to do or how to act.  
 Chapter III argues for understanding the conception of intuition (as described in Chapter I 
and II) as an expression of tacit knowledge. The motive behind this is in part a response to the 
restrictonist challenge. My goal is to provide a general framework that makes sense of intuitions 
in philosophy. By drawing upon the notion of tacit knowledge, I argue that we can better 
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understand what intuitions are, where they come from, what factors influence them, and what 
role they have in philosophical inquiry.  
 
Scope 
There are going to be relevant themes I will not be able to discuss for want of space. In 
particular, I will not be able to provide a taxonomy concerning the different types of intuitions 




Chapter I: Exploring Intuition 
There is a debate in contemporary philosophy about the role and significance of intuition. In 
particular, the debate surrounds the use of intuitions in philosophical inquiry. How should 
philosophy use intuition? This chapter will explore the various ways contemporary philosophers 
have used the notion of intuition.  
 
What are we Talking About? 
The question of what intuition is, is a complicated thing. The reason is that our answer will 
depend on what we take the task of philosophy to be, what role intuition should play in 
philosophy, and the nature of intuition itself.  
What we take philosophical inquiry to be will influence the role we want intuitions to 
play. What role we want intuitions to play will influence what we want to say about their nature. 
Also, what the nature of intuition is, will influence what role they should play. On top of all this, 
(if things weren’t difficult enough) the problem of the intuition skeptic influences what one 
thinks the task of philosophy is, the role of intuition in philosophy, and the nature of intuition 
itself. This depends on how one views the problem of intuition skepticism and how much weight 
one assigns it. In this section I will be highlighting the various ways contemporary philosophers 
have used intuition in philosophy.  
 
Setting the Scene 
Revival of Intuition 
According to Hintikka (1999), a revival of the use of intuitions was prompted by Chomsky’s 
linguistics. Chomsky used intuitions to reveal truths about the structure of language. For 
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example, the Chomskian researcher would ask an individual if a certain sentence is grammatical. 
Usually, the question posed had never been encountered by the individual. The response from the 
individual is the intuition. It is characterized as a spontaneous judgement. 
 In contemporary philosophy, philosophers appeal to intuitions in a similar way. The 
difference is that the setting has changed. Instead of revealing truths about language structure, 
they aim to use intuitions as evidence. Evidence for what? Such evidence is usually taken to have 
general applicability. For example, thought experiments like the Gettier Case produce a 
particular intuition viz., that the subject does not possess knowledge. The intuition is said to 
apply more generally, yielding insight into the nature of knowledge as such. Such intuition is 
also characterized as being a spontaneous judgement.  
 The problem Hintikka has with such appeals to intuitions is the fact that they do not have 
any respectable theoretical foundation (1999, 127). In older philosophical traditions, those who 
relied on intuitions provided reasons why intuitions have the right sort of information or insight – 
in other words, why they are reliable sources. For example, Aristotle’s notion of intuitive reason 
describes the way in which we grasp first principles of science from which all deductive 
reasoning starts. It is a type of apprehension by the soul. But contemporary philosophers’ appeals 
to intuition lack any similar justificatory foundation.  
 What contemporary philosophers need is a justification for their appeal to intuitions given 
the role they hold them to have – i.e. an evidential role. Hintikka (1999) claims that to justify our 
appeals to intuition in this sense, we need radically to change how we think of them. For 
Hintikka, intuitions that result from thought experiments tell us more about our concepts and 
language rather than any external truths. In addition, our intuitions are fallible and should not 
necessarily be epistemically privileged. That is to say, to justify a judgement based on intuition, 
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we need to do more than just appeal to the intuition itself.  But, Hintikka argues, contemporary 
philosophers do not see this, often invoking intuition as the sole justification of certain key 
claims.  
 
The Conceptual Analysts 
There is a style of philosophy that is consistent with Hintikka’s recommendations. Call this camp 
the Conceptual Analysts. Proponents of this view take philosophy to be concerned with 
understanding our concepts. Goldman (1999) argues that philosophers should be focused on 
making clear what the structure and content of our mental representations – i.e. concepts – are. 
In particular, philosophical inquiry should focus on elucidating our folk concepts (Goldman and 
Pust 1998, 190-191; Goldman 2007, 18). 
 The conceptual analysts take intuition to be a tool that helps elucidate our folk concepts. 
Our intuitions help us understand our concepts by making explicit their structure and content. So, 
for example, when one is confronted with Gettier-like cases, one judges that, say, Smith does not 
know that he has received the job. This intuition provides us with information relevant to our 
folk conception of knowledge – i.e. Knowledge as Justified True Belief. In this case, intuitions 




While the conceptual analyst project appears to be in line with Hintikka’s recommendation, there 
are other camps in philosophy that take a rather different route. Like the conceptual analysts, 
there is a camp that holds intuitions to have an evidential role. However, unlike the conceptual 
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analysts, they think that intuitions provide us with evidence for a priori truths. Call this camp the 
Rationalists.5 Intuitions are identified as sui generis states and are characterized differently from 
one rationalist to the next. Some hold that intuitions are intellectual seemings (Bealer 1998, 
2002; Pust 2000; Huemer 2005). Others characterize intuitions as propositions presented to the 
subject as being true (Chudnoff 2011). While proponents of this view differ in respect to 
intuition’s characteristics, there is a commonality that unites them. The rationalists argue that a 
belief is neither necessary nor sufficient for an intuition. Intuitions are belief-independent and 
presentational, in contrast to being belief-dependent and doxastic (Chudnoff 2011, 82). If you 
stare at a bright prink Bristol board for five minutes and then glare away looking at the rest of 
your room, you’ll notice that everything in your room appears to be coloured in shades of pink. 
Although you know that your room is not made up of various shades of pink, at the time the 
room presents itself this way. Intuitions are said to be like this. When we have an intuition that p, 
it appears to us that it is the case that p. This may or may not actually be the case, but intuitions 
present us with seemings. 
 On this view, intuitions are intellectual seemings concerning what is necessarily the case.  
For example, some object cannot be black and yellow all over all at once. At first, you may not 
be aware of the statement, but once consciously experienced, it just intellectually seems true. 
Therefore, such intuitions provide us with insights into the way the world necessarily is 
(BonJour 2001, 158). 
 
                                                
5 Some primary advocates of the view are George Bealer, Laurence BonJour, and Michael Huemer. 
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The Hybrids 
There is a further camp that paints yet another picture about intuition’s role in philosophy. This 
camp may be seen as a hybrid between the rationalists and conceptual analysts because they 
argue that intuition may play an evidential role in both respects. In his article “Philosophical 
Intuitions”, Mark Fedyk (2009) sets out to explain what philosophical intuitions are and explores 
what makes them reliable – i.e. reliable as a source of evidence. He holds that intuitions can have 
two ‘evidential roles’. The first role is that intuition may be a source of evidence concerning 
one’s concepts. The second role is that intuitions may be a source of evidence concerning 
whether or not a property is instantiated.  
For Fedyk: 
Intuitions are about—in the sense of, “is a response to”—the salient feature(s) of a case. 
The salient features of a case are the objects of an intuition. The propositional content of 
an intuition follows from the implicated concept. Thus, the basic idea is that an intuition 
is about the salient features of a case, it has propositional content, and the propositional 
content of an intuition is obtained in some way from the implicated concept. (2009, 56). 
 
To expand on this notion, Fedyk (2009, 58) applies it to the Gettier case. In the Gettier case, the 
object of the particular intuition (Smith does not know that he’ll get the job) is the salient feature 
of the case viz., Smith’s doxastic state. The propositional content of the intuition (i.e. what it’s 
about) stems from the implicated concept – i.e. the concept of knowledge.  
Given what’s been said, Fedyk states that intuitions have a presentation composed of: 
(1)  The case (e.g. Gettier case); 
(2)  The implicated concept (e.g. the concept of knowledge as JTB) and; 
(3)  The intuition itself (e.g. Smith does not know he has received the job). (2009, 66-67) 
 
Fedyk claims that if such an account is right, then intuitions can provide and present us with 
evidence in two ways. Concerning the first type of evidence, intuitions can be used as evidence 
to relay information about the intuitor’s concepts. For example, if you were to ask a lawyer about 
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the physical structure of time, her response would provide one with evidence about the lawyer’s 
concept of time, rather than the nature of time itself. Such a presentation of an intuition is used as 
a meaning-directed probe (Fedyk 2009, 68). However, if you asked Albert Einstein about the 
physical structure of time, his response would seem to provide one with evidence about whether 
or not time has such properties instantiated. Such an intuition is used as a world-directed probe 
(Fedyk 2009, 68). The difference between meaning-directed and world-directed probes is that the 
former is about the individual’s practices, values, beliefs, and the latter about the actual values of 
the world or something along these lines.   
 Fedyk inquires into the conditions under which it would be rational to use an intuition as 
a meaning-directed or a world-directed probe. Fedyk holds the following: 
It is rational to use a presentation of an intuition as a meaning-directed probe if there is 
reason to believe that the intuitor is able to make ordinary operative presuppositions 
about the case, and the intuition manifest in the presentation occurs in favourable 
circumstances. (2009, 69) 
 
It is rational to use a presentation of an intuition as a world-directed probe if there is 
reason to believe that the intuitor is able to make ordinary operative presuppositions 
about the case, and the intuition manifest in the presentation occurs in favourable 
circumstances, and that the implicated concept is sufficiently accurate. (2009, 71) 
 
Meaning-directed probe conditions: 
The idea of operative presuppositions is that the individual being probed is providing an intuition 
that conforms to what one would intuit in circumstances that reflect daily interactions or usage. 
The intuition would be reliable if it had some sort of external validity (e.g. the mental processes 
in the case reflect those that occur in daily life, the case is similar to one that an individual would 
come across, etc.).6  
                                                
6 See Bartels et al. (2014) for an excellent article discussing criteria regarding external validity and its conditions. 
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 Regarding the condition that the intuition in the presentation occurs in favourable 
circumstances, what I take Fedyk to mean is that even if the intuitor is able to operate in a 
context that reflects the everyday circumstances, he or she must be in a state that does not 
impinge or hinder the result of the intuition. The intuitor’s intuition mustn’t be tainted by 
irrelevant factors. So, for example, self-interest may hinder the reliability of my intuition. One 
should be in a clear state of mind. 
 
World-directed probe conditions: 
Like the meaning-directed conditions, the world-directed will have the conditions of operative 
presuppositions and the presentation of the intuition occurring in favourable circumstances. 
However, there is an additional condition viz., we should have good reason to hold that the 
intuition being presented is very likely to be true (Fedyk 2009, 70-71). If I understand the author 
correctly, the idea is that the implicated concept being used gets things right. The implicated 
concept itself should be highly reliable and conform to how things currently are done in the field. 
So, my conception of knowledge should be reliable in the sense that it maps onto the well-
grounded and established conception of knowledge in the current field. To take another example, 
my conception of time must be one that conforms to the best-established current conception of 
time. I believe the motive behind this is that if one’s conception of x conforms to the conception 
of x, then one is in a position to intuit whether or not some property is instantiated.  
 
Reliability: 
What does this tell us about intuition’s role and reliability? Well, philosophers’ presentations of 
intuitions can be legitimately used as world-directed probes and meaning-directed probes. 
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However, it is not always appropriate to use such presentations as world-directed probes (Fedyk 
2009, 77). The example he gives is that of fair contracts. A philosopher may be well aware of the 
concept of fair contracts, but have little experience with actual contracts (other than their tenure 
contracts). To consult a lawyer would be a wiser decision. Although philosophers may be experts 
on issues of social justice, this is not a reason to privilege their intuitions concerning contracts 
themselves, and to present such intuitions as world-directed probes (Fedyk 2009, 78).  
 So, intuitions, under the right circumstances, can be reliable sources of information that 
either (i) provide us with insights into the intuitor’s concepts or (ii) provide us with insights into 
whether or not a property is instantiated (for e.g., whether or not time itself possesses tensed 
properties). When it comes to philosophical intuitions, it may be that they provide us with 
information concerning (i) or (ii), but the more interesting project involves (ii) and it is not 
always appropriate to view philosophers’ intuitions as identifying the salient features of a 
situation. We should be aware of the conditions and contexts in which we claim that intuitions 
tell us anything about the salient features of a situation before we entertain such an idea, and this 
involves taking into account what the literature in experimental philosophy has said.  
 
The Experimental Philosophers 
Experimental philosophers practice philosophy in a similar manner to the sciences. They survey 
people, collect and analyze the data, and report on trends given by the data. A hot issue in 
experimental philosophy concerns understanding the role and status of intuitions in philosophy. 
These philosophers conduct experiments to test what people’s intuitions tell us. Their results are 
surprising. Joshua Alexander (2012, 72-81) highlights two general themes: (i) intuitions are 
diverse; and (ii) intuitions are sensitive. 
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 Concerning (i): intuitions are diverse in multiple categories. Studies found intuitional 
diversity by culture (Weinberg et al. 2001) and gender (Zamzow and Nichols 2009; Stich and 
Buckwalter 2011). For example, our intuitions may differ given our cultural background – I 
intuit p whereas you intuit not-p. The same goes for the other categories listed above. The point 
is that if you provide a group of people with the same set of information concerning a case, their 
intuitions differ because of external factors outside the scope of the case.  
 Concerning (ii): intuitions are sensitive to various factors. In particular, they are sensitive 
to interpersonal factors (Alexander 2012, 78). In addition to interpersonal factors, intuitions are 
sensitive to intrapersonal factors (Alexander 2012, 78). The idea being that intuitions vary 
within the individual. My intuitions may change given the context and sometimes they may even 
conflict. For example, I may have the intuition that killing is always morally wrong, but in a case 
of self-defense, I may rightly think that it is morally permissible to kill someone as a way to 
protect myself. 
 The force of these findings comes from inquiring into why our intuitions are diverse and 
sensitive. In particular, experimental philosophers want to know what factors influence 
intuitional diversity and sensitivity. What is most surprising is that their findings show our 
intuitions track features of a case that do not pertain to the truth or relevance of the matter at 
hand. What relevance does cultural background have when inquiring into whether a subject 
possesses knowledge? 
 Because philosophers appeal to intuitions as evidence, and such evidence appears to be 
influenced by irrelevant factors, experimental philosophers recommend that philosophers should 
stop appealing to intuitions because they are an unreliable source of information and we do not 
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know much about their workings.7 Hence, these findings produce a pessimistic outlook 
surrounding the idea that intuitions should serve an evidential role in philosophical inquiry. 
 
The Eliminativists 
In a similar vein, there is another camp that doubts intuition’s evidential role in philosophy. 
However, unlike the experimental philosophers, they argue that philosophy does not in fact rely 
on intuitions. Call this camp the Eliminativists. Herman Cappelen argues that most philosophers 
think that the Centrality Thesis is true: 
Centrality: Contemporary analytic philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence (or as a 
source for evidence) for philosophical theories. (2012, 4) 
 
But Cappelen rejects Centrality. He puts forth the claim that intuitions do not play an evidential 
role in philosophy and that much of the ‘intuition’-talk is exaggerated (Cappelen 2012, 18). What 
are we doing when we use ‘intuition’ in philosophy? The eliminativists respond by claiming that 
our usage of the term reflects: 
(1)  A mere disposition-to-believe; 
(2)  A hidden assumption or; 
(3)  A rhetorical tool. 
 
Concerning (1): If intuitions are dispositions-to-believe, then they do not provide one with 
justification for the belief in question, but rather incline us towards holding the belief. The idea is 
simple: If I’m inclined to believe that candy filled with sugar is healthy for me, my inclination 
does nothing to justify the belief itself. There needs to be something else to verify my belief. 
Merely having an inclination does not produce justification.  
                                                
7 Not all experimental philosophers hold this position. But there is a good majority who think that we should stop 
relying on intuitions given what their experiments demonstrate. 
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Concerning (2): On occasion, our ‘intuitions’ are hidden assumptions in arguments not 
made explicit. To highlight the point, let’s take an example from perceptual evidence. Imagine 
you saw me place my wallet by the front door the night before. The next day I ask you if you 
know where my wallet is and you respond by saying “I believe it is by the front door”. Now 
there is nothing wrong with that response. I wouldn’t say “How did you form this belief?” 
Although you form the belief that Nick’s wallet is by the front door via perception, this needn’t 
be made explicit. It’s a hidden (or underlying) assumption that forms the belief that Nick’s wallet 
is by the front door.  
Sometimes, intuitions are said to be like this. They are implicit assumptions not made 
explicit but nonetheless operative. They operate in the context of the theory one holds to be true. 
Let’s apply this to the Gettier case. One’s belief that ‘Smith does not know he will get the job’ is 
in part operating on a hidden assumption concerning one’s theory of knowledge (or at the very 
least, features of knowledge). The hidden assumption concerns the idea that knowledge requires 
more than justified true belief, though one may not have a clear picture (or hold consciously) 
what else may be required of knowledge. However, unlike the perceptual faculty, we are 
unaware of what system underlies the formation of our intuitions. If this is the case, intuitions do 
not justify beliefs. Instead, one should try and find reasons why people have such intuitions. In 
other words, one cannot rely on intuitions as evidence because one needs to carefully understand 
what intuitions are expressions of.  
Concerning (3): Intuitions can play a rhetorical role. When one relies on intuition, one is 
not relying on reason to convince one’s interlocutors. Instead, intuitions are used as tools of 
persuasion. Intuitions are used to get your interlocutors to see the value of your philosophical 
theory, belief, or argument. However, persuading someone of a view is not itself justification for 
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the view. I can persuade you that cookies are good for your health by telling you their taste 
counts in favour of their goodness, but my persuasive pull does not justify you having the belief 
that cookies are good for your health. So intuitions may be used to persuade others of one’s 
viewpoint, but this is different from providing evidence of one’s view.  
 
But That’s Not All!  
We can see how one may find truth in the eliminativist position, but their view is not free from 
critique. In his paper, David Chalmers (2014) argues for a minimal conception of intuition that 
captures our everyday philosophical usage of the term. His method involves looking at 
Cappelen’s Philosophy Without Intuitions and responding accordingly. 
As highlighted above, Cappelen holds that philosophers hold true the Centrality Thesis, 
but he attempts to show it is false by using linguistic and textual analysis that demonstrates 
philosophers’ practice does not in fact reflect the Centrality Thesis.  
Cappelen does not provide a definition of intuition, but he claims that intuitions have 
three features: 
(F1) They have a special phenomenology 
(F2) They have a special epistemic status, in that they justify but do not need justification 
(F3) They are based solely on conceptual competence (2012, 112-113) 
 
Cappelen’s strategy is to look at particular philosophical cases that are said to be instances of 
appeals to intuition (e.g. Gettier cases, trolley problems, etc.) and showing that there is little 
evidence that such appeals have any of the three features, hence demonstrating that the Centrality 
Thesis is false.  
Chalmers responds by claiming that these three features are not necessary features of 
intuition and that the notion is much broader than Cappelen’s conception (2014, 536). 
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Concerning (F1), Chalmers believes that it is a theoretical claim about intuitions that may or may 
not be true. (F3) holds for (at most) a subclass of intuitions, and (F2) needs qualification, but is 
the most important feature.  
 Concerning (F2), Chalmers thinks it is crucial that they have this special epistemic status 
that justifies but does not need justification. The reason being that such justification reflects the 
way philosophers’ practice appeals to intuitions. We think they play some sort of evidential role 
in that they justify but do not need justification. But what type of justification? Chalmers does 
not think we use intuitions as inferential, perceptual, memorial, testimonial, or (usually) 
introspective justification. He thinks the justification is an intuitive justification that exhibits 
some sort of response like “This seems obvious” (Chalmers 2014, 536). For Chalmers’ purposes: 
Broadly Inferential Justification: a justification is broadly inferential if it is inferential, 
perceptual, introspective, memorial, or testimonial (2014, 536-537). 
 
Broadly Noninferential Justification: a justification is broadly noninferential if it is not 
derived from sources of a broadly inferential nature (2014, 537). 
 
There are two subtleties Chalmers and Cappelen acknowledge. The first is that, “intuitions have 
broadly noninferential justification, so they do not need inferential justification to be justified, 
but they may nevertheless have inferential justification” (Chalmers 2014, 537). The idea is that 
intuitions may be justified by other sources, but such justification is not required. So if a claim 
has inferential justification, it does not mean it is not an intuition. Rather, what matters is that the 
claim’s justification does not depend on inferential justification.  
The second subtlety is that, “it is far from obvious that the intuitions that philosophers 
appeal to have a noninferential epistemic justification” (Chalmers 2014, 537). For example, it 
could be the case that the intuition solicited by a trolley problem is inferentially (but non-
obviously) justified. What matters is that the use of intuitions in philosophy have a dialectical 
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justificatory status (Chalmers 2014, 537). The difference between epistemic and dialectical 
justification is that the former supports a subject’s belief and the latter concerns how a subject 
supports her claim to someone else (Chalmers 2014, 537). I believe the reason why Chalmers 
holds intuitions to have a dialectical rather than an epistemic justificatory status is that we are 
more focused on the method by which we justify appeals to intuitions rather than how we 
support our own beliefs. This is because philosophers appeal to intuitions as evidence. So, 
appeals to intuitions are intuitive claims that have a dialectical justification that are broadly 
noninferential.  
 Chalmers concludes by noting that there are two worries with his conception of intuition. 
The first is an epistemological worry concerning how any judgement could have broadly 
noninferential support (Chalmers 2014, 543-544). There is no model which paints a clear picture 
of the support system and there is no clear way we can come to have access or knowledge of it. 
Because of this, intuitions seem to be “mysterious”. The second worry is a methodological one. 
“Why should we accept a claim whose dialectical justification is broadly noninferential when 
there is disagreement over the claim” (Chalmers 2014, 544). This suggests that the dialectical 
justification is not universally recognized and this reduces the force of the claim because there 
doesn’t seem to be full support of appeals to intuition being used as evidence through broadly 
noninferential justification. Think of it this way: if I disagree with you about an inference, I can 
show you why by means of another inference that may override yours. But, the same cannot be 
done with noninferential justifications. There seems to be a sort of stalemate. So how do we 
recognize the force of noninferential justification if we disagree about its place in philosophy? 
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Things to be Aware of 
So far we’ve discussed the different ways contemporary philosophers appeal to intuition. All of 
the authors aim to understand what role they play in philosophical inquiry. Yet, we haven’t 
explored how these philosophers have come to hold their views on intuition. It will be useful to 
make explicit the factors that influence what role and significance intuition has in philosophy.  
 In “The Role of Intuitions in Philosophy”, Daniel Cohnitz and Sören Häggqvist (2009) 
explore the relationship between our use of intuitions and their adjudicating philosophical truths. 
The authors notice that what role intuitions have is closely associated with the question of what 
the nature of intuitions are and vice versa. The role and nature of intuitions seem to have some 
sort of dependency or at least some sort of correlation.  
 Now what intuitions are evidence for depends on what philosophy is concerned with. In 
other words, what the nature of philosophy is will in a sense determine what type of 
role/evidence intuitions have/are. Cohnitz and Häggqvist highlight three conceptions of 
philosophical inquiry: 
Metaphysical Conception: Philosophy is concerned with metaphysical issues that aim to 
identify and understand the “essence” of things – e.g. What is x? where x can be 
knowledge, truth, identity, etc.  
 
Conceptual Analysis: Philosophy is concerned with the meaning of terms – e.g. What 
does x mean? Where x can be knowledge, truth, etc.  
 
Ideal Language Conception: Philosophy is concerned with the meaning of terms, but 
unlike conceptual analysis, it is concerned with its ideal conception – e.g. In the ideal 
context, what does x mean? Where x can be truth, identity, etc. (2009, 9).  
 
It would be redundant to provide examples for all three conceptions, so I will appeal to one to 
highlight the point. If philosophical inquiry is conceptual analysis, then philosophy aims at 
understanding what ordinary folk mean by x. For our purposes, let x be knowledge. Philosophy, 
then, aims at understanding what knowledge is. What role do our intuitions have in all this? 
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Well, our intuitions provide and produce insights into what ordinary folk mean when they speak 
of knowledge. Since conceptual analysis is concerned with the concept of knowledge, our 
intuitions provide us insights into what our conception consists of. Our intuitions aim to make 
clear what we mean by knowledge. They are reliable indicators concerning the values, beliefs, 
and practices we hold. We can say that intuition’s role is to provide one with evidence 
surrounding the ordinary folk concept of knowledge (or whatever x may be).  
As was said above, whether intuitions are evidence depends on what they are evidence 
for. Another important question concerns whether or not the various types of intuitions share a 
common lineage. Is there some underlying nature that the various types of intuitions – e.g. 
intuitions as beliefs, as dispositions-to-believe, or intellectual seemings – share? This matters 
because if something underlies one type of intuition and such feature proves to be problematic, 
then if all other types have this feature, then they will also encounter this problem. If on the other 
hand, they do not share a common nature, while there may not be the same problem facing all 
types of intuitions, there may be a problem of whether a particular domain can be said to reliably 
rely on a group of intuitions. Hence, the significance of Cohnitz’s and Häggqvist’s article is that 
the role of intuition depends (I don’t think it ultimately depends, but rather some dependency) on 
what we take philosophy to be. In addition, how we identify intuition depends on various factors 
and the weight we assign to them – e.g. one element of consideration is whether we identify 
intuitions with the process or results of a philosophical inquiry.  
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Map of the Discussion 
Before we move onto the next chapter, it will be useful to provide an overview of the discussion 
thus far. In particular, it will be useful to highlight the various roles, natures, and characteristics 
of intuitions discussed above. Here is a figure laying out these themes: 
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Table 1: Overview of Intuition 
 
 Nature Role Characteristics 
Hintikka’s 
Suggestion 
-Identified as the 
propositional content 
of a claim – i.e. p 
-The result of 
intuiting is the 
intuition 
-Evidential 
-Evidence for what? 
-Should be evidence 








Conceptual Analysts -Propositional 
content 
-Evidential 




Rationalists -Sui generis states -Evidential 




true (e.g. stick in 
water seems bent) 
Hybrids -About the salient 
feature(s) of a case 
-Evidential 
-Evidence for what? 
- (i) one’s concepts 
and (ii) whether or 












stop relying on 
intuitions as evidence 
because they are 
unreliable 
 
-Tells us how human 
beings think 
-How we are – i.e. 
human nature 
Eliminativists ?? -Non-evidential 
Philosophers do not 
rely on intuitions as 
evidence (mistake to 
think so) 






-Based solely on 
conceptual 
competence 





-Evidence for what? 











Chapter II: Exploring Yet Another Form of Intuition 
In the first chapter, we described intuitions as inputs or data points. In this sense, intuitions are 
evidence for or against philosophical theories. However, this is not the only conception of 
intuition’s nature and role in philosophical inquiry. There is yet another conception that figures 
prominently in the work of some philosophers.  These philosophers find a role for intuition (or 
something like it) in their theory of judgement. This chapter aims to explore the nature and role 
of intuition in this second sense – i.e. intuition as an important constituent of judgement. 
 
Characteristics of Intuitive Judgement 
We need to make clear the distinction between the intuition explored in the first chapter and the 
one explored here. First and foremost, in the latter conception intuitions do not figure as 
evidence for or against philosophical theories. Intuitions here figure as constituent features of 
judgements. An instance of this example is when one has the intuition that killing is morally 
wrong. This intuition is not used as evidence from which the philosopher might make inferences 
about the intuitor’s concepts or beliefs or about what is the case, but rather as an expression of 
the intuitor’s knowledge made in the relevant context. This intuition does not tell us which 
theory is right or wrong – i.e. intuitions are not necessarily about theories – but rather about 
understanding or apprehending the relevant features of a case, exercised in the form of a 
judgement. The intuition is about what to do, or how to act. The intuition that p is not used as 
evidence for p. It is an expression of one’s knowledge that p. 
 Secondly, not all philosophers who find a role for intuitive judgement in this way 
explicitly use the term “intuition”. For example, a number of philosophers talk about 
apprehending a moral truth in a way that suggests that the apprehension in question is intuitive, 
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even though they make no explicit mention or use of the word. What these philosophers have in 
mind is a kind of judgement that does not follow from explicit, articulable reasoning, but is like a 
perceptual judgement in that it is contextually situated and issues from a process or procedure 
that is non-codifiable. Judgement about what to do cannot be exhaustively determined by rules 
and principles.  
  
Intuition in Moral Philosophy 
So where can we find this use of intuition? One place we should look to is moral philosophy. In 
particular, the ethical intuitionist tradition appears to make heavy use of intuitive judgement in 
the relevant sense. There are also branches in moral philosophy that either follow closely or stem 
directly from the intuitionist tradition, though they do not deploy the term “intuition”. Thus I will 
be examining the characteristics of intuitive judgement at work in Moore’s, Ross’s, and 
Prichard’s intuitionism, but also McDowell’s conception of the virtuous agent, and Dancy’s 
particularism. The goal is to highlight and make explicit the various similarities that are crucial 
for understanding the nature of intuitive judgement.  
 
Moore’s Intuitionism 
In his Principia Ethica, G.E. Moore sets out to understand what ‘good’ is. His inquiry stems 
from the unsatisfactory accounts his predecessors had to offer. Some would equate goodness 
with pleasure and others with the satisfaction of desire. Such views were usually associated with 
Utilitarianism. Utilitarians state that the best course of action is one which maximizes utility 
while producing the least amount of disutility. The factors that go into deciding what course of 
action is the best depend on the particular Utilitarian theory at issue.  Some utilitarians think of 
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utility in terms of happiness; some favour preference-satisfaction.  Some utilitarians suppose we 
should act in light of the utility of particular acts; others argue we should act in accord with a 
system of rules adherence to which will promote the most overall utility.   
The problem Moore had with these accounts is that they seemed insufficient to capture 
the notion of ‘good’. Although things like pleasure and desire may have goodness in them, they 
fall short of being good. Moreover, he thinks it is a mistake to equate pleasure and desire with 
goodness because such association commits what he calls a “naturalistic fallacy”: 
But far too many philosophers have thought that when they named those other properties 
they were actually defining good; that these properties, in fact, were simply not ‘other,’ 
but absolutely and entirely the same with goodness. This view I propose to call the 
‘naturalistic fallacy’ and of it I shall now endeavour to dispose. (Moore 1903, 10) 
 
One commits the naturalistic fallacy when one identifies moral properties with natural properties. 
According to Moore, moral properties cannot be reduced to natural properties. He highlights the 
fallacious reasoning by using the example of colour first. Taking the colour yellow, we can say 
that it produces particular wavelengths. Further we can identify the colour yellow with these 
particular wavelengths. However, once we identify yellow with the wavelengths, we’ve 
committed the fallacy. When we say we see yellow, we do not mean to say we see these 
particular wavelengths. Far from it. What we perceive is the yellow itself. The fact that we can 
identify the particular wavelengths comes after the fact that we can identify what yellow is. All 
that we are entitled to say is that these wavelengths correspond to the colour yellow (Moore 
1903, 10). 
 Similarly, when one identifies the good with pleasure or desire, one commits the fallacy. 
Imagine that what is good is identical to that which is pleasurable. When we say of something 
that it is good, we do not mean to say that it is simply pleasurable. What we identify is the 
goodness itself. The fact that we can identify pleasure comes after the fact that we can identify 
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what a good is. All we are entitled to say (if we are even entitled to say that) is that pleasure is 
usually somehow correlated with with goodness.  
 Moore thinks it is an open question whether some object that has a natural property is 
good. That is to say, we can always ask the additional question “But is it good?”. Let us take 
good to be identical to pleasure. When one says, “x is good”, then one means to say that “x is 
pleasurable”. But Moore thinks that can’t be right, because if one asserts that “pleasure is good”, 
one appears to be saying more than “pleasure is pleasure”. We can always ask of some 
pleasurable act the additional question “is it good?”. It remains an open question as to whether or 
not some natural property or object is good. 
 What does this reveal about the nature of the good? Moore thinks that one is in a position 
to see that the good is a property that is peculiar, non-natural, simple and indefinable (Moore 
1903, Ch. 1). It is non-natural because a description of an object, action or event in purely natural 
terms is unable to capture its goodness in the full sense. It is simple (primary) because it cannot 
be decomposed or analyzed into further properties of which it is comprised. It is indefinable 
because it cannot be defined in terms of natural properties. From this, one may conclude that 
moral terms like ‘good’ are peculiar (sui generis) because they do not conform to the way we 
describe the world naturally. It follows that the truth of moral judgements cannot be derived by 
analyzing the concepts ‘good’, ‘bad’, ‘right’, ‘wrong’, nor can they simply be derived from sense 
experiences – e.g. looking out into the world and locating the property of ‘goodness’ as one 
might look and see through the window that there is a bird in a tree. 
 So how do we arrive at the truth of moral claims? He asks: “what is the nature of the 
evidence, by which alone any ethical proposition can be proved or disproved, confirmed or 
rendered doubtful” (Moore 1903, Preface viii). Moore thinks that our intuitions allow us to grasp 
 28 
moral truths. By exercising intuitive judgement, we are in a position to know whether something 
is good or bad. He writes: 
Again, I would wish it observed that, when I call such propositions ‘Intuitions,’ I mean 
merely to assert that they are incapable of proof; I imply nothing whatever as to the 
manner or origin of our cognition of them. Still less do I imply (as most Intuitionists have 
done) that any proposition whatever is true, because we cognize it in a particular way or 
by the exercise of any particular faculty: I hold, on the contrary, that in every way in 
which it is possible to cognize a true proposition, it is also possible to cognize a false one. 
(Moore 1903, Preface x) 
 
A few things can be said of Moorean intuitions. First, they only concern knowing the good in 
itself (Moore 1903, Preface viii). This is in contrast to intuitions being concerned with what 
actions we ought to perform in accordance with the good – i.e. matters concerning right actions 
and duties. Second, while there may be evidence as to what actions we ought to perform, there is 
no evidence in the same way as to what the good is. The former is capable of proof while the 
latter is not. Third, while our intuitions may be true, they do not amount to proof. Intuitions are 
no more proof as they are disproof. This leads to the last point; namely, that our intuitions may 
be fallible. We may intuit false propositions just as well as we may intuit true ones. 
One may also note that Moore does not commit himself to the idea of there being a 
faculty of intuition. Nothing in what he says leads him to hold the view that there is a faculty that 
administers data relevant to intuition. All that has been said is that our intuitions deal with non-
natural, indefinable, and peculiar things. In the next section, we will turn to Prichard and 
consider how he saw the role of intuitions.  
 
Prichard’s Intuitionism 
Influenced by Moore’s Principia Ethica, H.A. Prichard wrote “Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a 
Mistake?” (1912) to clarify the aim of moral philosophical inquiry. Like Moore, Prichard is an 
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ethical intuitionist, who holds that we can arrive at moral truths by employing our intuitions to 
grasp the salient features of a situation. However, where Moore is concerned with the good, 
Prichard concerns himself with obligations.  As we will see shortly, Prichard drifted away from 
Moore in that he thinks it is a mistake to provide principles of obligations derived from what is – 
or is known to be – good.  
 Prichard observes that the moral philosophers of his time are concerned with providing 
justifications for one’s obligations. They try to provide answers to questions like, “Is it really my 
duty to repay my debt?” and “Why am I obliged to be benevolent?”. He thinks it is a mistake for 
moral philosophers to answer these questions. These questions are in fact illegitimate (Prichard 
1912, 34).  
 To appreciate his view, it is important to understand the nature of obligations. For 
Prichard, our sense of obligation is “absolutely underivative or immediate” (Prichard 1912, 27). 
He states: 
The rightness of an action consists in its being the origination of something of a certain 
kind A in a situation of a certain kind, a situation consisting in a certain relation B of the 
agent to others or to his own nature (Prichard 1912, 27). 
 
The relation of the agent to others or to him- or herself carries an immediate apprehension of 
knowing what to do or how to act in the particular case. The obligation here is the commitment 
to such a course of action that stems from the particular case. Just as one is able to grasp that a 
three-sided figure must have three angles by attending to the subject matter, so too one can grasp 
that it is one’s obligation to do x by attending to the subject matter of x – given the particular 
circumstances that call for x. Here then, one’s obligations are grasped by attending to the 
situation at hand. The grasping itself is said to be immediate in the sense that the truth of what is 
being grasped is self-evident – similar to how one grasps certain mathematical truths. Our 
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intuitions are that which make us grasp what our obligations are. They give rise to how we ought 
to act or what we ought to do. Notice that our sense of obligation is incapable of proof or 
demonstration in the way that we can show empirically that grass is green.  
 We are now in a position to appreciate the force of Prichard’s claim that moral 
philosophers’ quest to provide proof of, or evidence for, our obligations is mistaken. If our 
judgement that we have an obligation to x issues from grasping a truth by attending to a situation, 
and this grasping is immediate and self-evident, then to ask if one’s obligation to x is really one’s 
obligation is to miss the point completely. Once you see in this way that you have an obligation 
to x, there is no place for the further question of whether you ought to do what you see you have 
an obligation to do.  
 Prichard parallels this line of thought and argues that epistemology rests on the same 
mistake. He writes: 
As I urged before, at some time or other in the history of all of us, if we are thoughtful, 
the frequency of our own and of others’ mistakes is bound to lead to the reflexion that 
possibly we and others have always been mistaken in consequence of some radical defect 
of our faculties. In consequence certain things which previously we should have said 
without hesitation that we knew, as, e.g., that 4 x 7 = 28, become subject to doubt; we 
become able only to say that we thought we knew these things. (Prichard 1912, 34) 
 
Epistemologists typically respond to this skepticism by attempting to show how it is we know 
what we know. But Prichard thinks that the source of such skepticism is not genuine (1912, 35). 
This is because we are not doubting knowledge per se, but rather our belief. When we doubt 
whether we know 4 x 7 = 28, we are doubting whether our belief that 4 x 7 = 28 is true, not our 
knowledge of 4 x 7 = 28. If we come to appreciate that the skeptical doubt does not concern itself 
with knowledge but mere belief, then the skepticism towards our knowledge becomes misplaced. 
Prichard thinks that by understanding how one arrives at knowledge, one is able to understand 
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the nature of knowledge itself (1912, 35). It is by intuitively grasping certain claims as self-
evident that one is said to be in a position of knowing.  
 Two things follow. First, Prichard argues that radical skeptical doubt of the kind 
exemplified by Descartes’ Evil Genius hypothesis is utterly confused, resting on the idea that we 
need to provide additional proof of what we know, whereas knowledge in fact rests on the 
immediate recognition of truths that do not admit of proof.  Second, Prichard recognizes that 
genuine doubt arises from losing one’s grip on what was apprehended in a previous state of mind 
(Prichard 1912, 35-36). For example, I genuinely doubt whether 4 x 7 = 28 when I cannot recall 
the method at arriving at the truth of this statement. The way to figure out whether or not 4 x 7 = 
28 is to attend to the mathematical relations involved. In other words, “do the sum again” 
(Prichard 1912, 36). More broadly, he writes: 
Or, to put the matter generally, if we do come to doubt whether it is true that A is B, as 
we once thought, the remedy lies not in any process of [philosophical] reflexion but in 
such a reconsideration of the nature of A and B as leads to the knowledge that A is B. 
(Prichard 1912, 36) 
 
The lesson being that we do not need to engage in philosophical reflection of whether we know 
what we take ourselves to know, but rather to consider the particular case at hand and deploy 
familiar methods to ascertain whether what we believe is true. Knowledge is immediate and self-
evident; when one is in possession of knowledge, one is in a position to know. It is as simple as 
that.  
 Returning to the moral case, the nature of moral philosophy does not concern itself with 
providing justification or proofs for one’s obligations; the obligation is the reason why you 
should do it. It requires no further proof; hence it is a mistake to ask what justifies our obligation 
to do some particular action.  
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 If we genuinely come to doubt our obligation – where genuine doubt is losing sight of 
how one came to hold the obligation – then the only remedy is to attend to the particular situation 
at hand and see if one is obliged to act accordingly. If the answer is positive, then one comes to 
know what one’s obligation is. If the answer is negative, then one comes to know that it is not 
one’s duty to act accordingly in the situation at hand.  
 To sum up Prichard’s intuitionism, he thinks that when moral philosophers attempt to 
provide justifications for our obligations, they are making a mistake.  When one comes to 
appreciate where one’s obligation lies, one is in a position to see that the obligation itself is the 
reason to act accordingly and no further proof is required. Knowledge of one’s obligation is 
immediate and self-evident. One grasps what one’s obligations are by exercising intuitive 
judgement in the particular case at hand. One thereby understands what one’s obligations are.  
 
Ross’s Intuitionism 
Like Prichard, W.D. Ross was also heavily influenced by Moore’s Principia Ethica. In addition 
to Moore’s writings, Ross benefitted greatly from discussion with Prichard, who influenced the 
position Ross took in his famous book, The Right and the Good.  
What Ross advocates in the first two chapters of his book can be seen as a hybrid of 
Moore’s view on the good and Prichard’s view on the nature of obligation.  Similar to Moore’s 
position in that there is a difference between something that is good and goodness itself, Ross 
argues there is a difference between a right act and rightness in itself. But whereas Moore 
thought that the good in itself is the chief and only aim of moral inquiry, Ross departs from this 
view. The reason is that Moore frames the ‘good’ in a way tied to the consequences of one’s 
action – i.e. the action to do is the one that produces the most amount of the sui generis property 
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of goodness. Moore’s view appears to be a type of Utilitarianism, namely, Ideal Utilitarianism. 
The thought being that what determines the good is the consequences and we should strive to 
produce the best overall consequences. For Ross, however, morality concerns itself with duties – 
not motives or consequences, but rather actions (Ross 1930, 42-43). He thinks that while we may 
have a prima facie duty to promote the good, it is but one of several prima facie duties. Prima 
facie duties are duties that hold ‘at first sight’. Ross writes: 
I suggest ‘prima facie duty’ or ‘conditional duty’ as a brief way of referring to the 
characteristic (quite distinct from that of being a duty proper) which an act has, in virtue 
of being of a certain kind (e.g. the keeping of a promise), of being an act which would be 
a duty proper if it were not at the same time of another kind which is morally significant. 
(1930, 19) 
 
Our prima facie duties are expressed as principles. Ross identifies seven prima facie duties: 
fidelity; reparation; gratitude; non-maleficence; justice; beneficence; and self-improvement 
(1930, 21-22).8  
 Another important point is that our prima facie duties to act in certain ways are self-
evident. They are self-evident in the way that certain axiomatic truths are self-evident. For 
example, we know that the shortest distance between two points is a straight line by grasping that 
in this case, the shortest distance is a straight line and in that case, the shortest distance is a 
straight line. Similarly, our prima facie duties are self-evident in the sense that in this case it 
appears to be our duty to keep our promise and in that case, it appears to be our duty to keep our 
promise. It is not self-evident in the sense of being obvious. Axiomatic truths are not necessarily 
obvious; one needs to be in a position to understand the relationship of certain mathematical 
truths in order to see what is self-evident. Ross states: 
For the nature of the self-evident is not to be evident to every mind however 
undeveloped, but to be apprehended directly by minds which have reached a certain 
degree of maturity, and for minds to reach the necessary degree of maturity the 
                                                
8 The list is not intended to be exhaustive.  
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development that takes place from generation to generation is as much needed as that 
which takes place from infancy to adult life. (1930, 12) 
 
Our prima facie duties are self-evident in the sense that, given our experience and sufficient 
attention to what is being proposed, they require no proof beyond themselves (Ross 1930, 29). 
Similarities can be seen here with Prichard’s claim that for something to be our obligation, we 
need to look no further than apprehending the nature of the obligation itself.  
Yet there is another point to take notice of, namely, that our prima facie duties are not 
necessarily our duties proper. Ross holds that, “whether an act is a duty proper or actual duty 
depends on all the morally significant kinds it is an instance of” (Ross 1930, 19-20). What I take 
him to mean is that whether or not one of our prima facie duties are our actual or proper duties 
depends on the morally relevant features of a situation. The morally salient features of a situation 
determine what our actual or proper duty is. This is to be contrasted with prima facie duties 
because they only admit to claims about the character of certain actions, e.g. on first sight, 
fulfilling one’s promise appears to be an action one ought to do. But whether or not one ought to 
fulfill a promise depends on the morally relevant features of a situation. For example, if fulfilling 
my promise to tell one of my friends the truth about their aesthetic appearance (in which they 
lack) when they ask me, it may not be my duty to fulfill my promise because I know that the 
truth will harm them more than help. In this case, fulfilling my promise is not my duty proper 
though promise keeping is still a prima facie duty.  
Thus Ross recognizes that our prima facie duties will conflict. That there are these 
principles which tell me to keep my promise, improve my character, or pay my debts, it is by 
their nature that they may cross paths whereby they point in different directions. What are we to 
do in situations where our prima facie duties conflict? Is there a general principle which tells us 
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what we ought to do or how we ought to act given the conflict of such prima facie duties? To 
this, Ross writes: 
When I am in a situation, as perhaps I always am, in which more than one of these prima 
facie duties is incumbent on me, what I have to do is to study the situation as fully as I 
can until I form the considered opinion (it is never more) that in the circumstances one of 
them is more incumbent than any other; then I am bound to think that to do this prima 
facie duty is my duty sans phrase in the situation. (1930, 19) 
 
This passage implies that there is no overarching principle that tells us what we ought to do in 
circumstances where our prima facie duties conflict. What one ought to do “sans phrase” cannot 
be codified or be expressed by a simply moral theory. What it is to know what our actual duty is, 
when our prima facie duties conflict, is to be in a position to understand the situation in its 
entirety and judge that it is one rather than another prima facie duty that is our actual duty.  
 Such a judgement is an intuitive judgement and Ross characterizes it as a considered 
opinion. It isn’t some sort of uneducated guess where we happen to form an opinion as to what to 
do. Rather, as agents with moral character, we pay particular attention to the details of a situation 
and form a judgement that accords with what the situation itself calls for. Concerning our 
judgements about particular duties, Ross writes: 
There is no principle by which we can draw the conclusion that it is on the whole right or 
the whole wrong. In this respect the judgement as to the rightness of a particular act is 
just like the judgement as to the beauty of a particular natural object or work of art. 
(1930, 31) 
 
The judging of what one’s actual duties are is performed intuitively, enabling knowledge of what 
one has a duty to do in the relative context.  Similar to art and beauty, there is no guide or 
overarching principle that dictates the outcome of our intuitive judgements. This is not to say that 
our intuitive judgements are subjective, but rather that they are particular. What makes this 
painting beautiful is that dash of fuchsia, whereas what makes that painting lack beauty is that 
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dash of fuchsia. Thus, the role intuitions play is one in which judgement is exercised between 
conflicting prima facie duties concerning how one ought to act.  
 To sum up Ross, his view combines the insights of Moore and Prichard. Morality 
concerns itself with duties and duties are concerned with actions. We have prima facie duties to 
act in certain ways and this stems from the distinct character of the actions themselves. When our 
prima facie duties conflict, there is no overarching principle that tells us how we ought to act in 
the case at hand. Instead, we have no choice but to consider what our intuitions tell us about the 
particular case.  
 
McDowell’s Virtuous Agent 
Moving forward roughly half a century, John McDowell remarks on the nature of a moral 
outlook: 
It may seem that the very idea of a moral outlook makes room for, and requires, the 
existence of moral theory, conceived as a discipline which seeks to formulate acceptable 
principles of conduct. (McDowell 1979, 331) 
 
McDowell proceeds to reject this view. While he thinks ethics is concerned with how people 
should live, he denies that a moral outlook should be characterized as a set of principles or a 
theory of right action. Rather, in his essay, “Virtue and Reason”, he paints a different picture, 
focusing on the idea of a virtuous agent. The virtuous agent is described as being in possession of 
knowledge of how to act exemplified by her reliable sensibilities (McDowell 1979, 331-332). 
McDowell works with the virtue of kindness. The virtuous agent demonstrates her possession of 
kindness by being able to judge “the thing to do” (McDowell 1979, 332). What is characteristic 
of this judgement is that it stems neither from non-rational habit or instinct, nor from any codes 
of conduct that determine how to act in every case. Rather, the judgement exhibits a reliable 
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sensitivity that is perceptive of the morally-relevant details of a situation. McDowell identifies 
this sensibility with the virtuous agent’s knowledge of virtue, in this case kindness. Her 
sensitivity is an instance (or expression) of knowledge.  
 However, McDowell notes that the virtuous agent needs not express her knowledge in an 
articulate or explicit manner (1979, 32). That is, she does not need to identify attributes of a 
particular action as kind, or to express the grounds on which she decided to act kindly.9 It is 
sufficient that the virtuous agent responds accordingly to situations which call for kindness. 
Being able to identify an action or attributes of an action as kind goes above and beyond being in 
possession of the relevant knowledge. It is the thing she does that demonstrates or exemplifies 
her possession of kindness.  
 Thus, what is characteristic of the virtuous agent is that she is able to intuitively judge 
what is required of her given the circumstances. What is required of her depends on the morally 
salient features of the case – i.e. the details of a situation that calls for attention. Her being able to 
respond accordingly is an exercise of her possession of knowledge. And this is identified with 
her reliable sensitivities that enable her to discern what ought to be done.  
 
Dancy’s Particularism 
Jonathan Dancy builds on McDowell’s position, developing it into the position that has come to 
be known as “ethical particularism” (see Bakhurst 2000). In his book, Moral Reasons, Dancy 
(1993) explains and defends his particularism against the position he calls “generalism”. 
Generalism is the theory that there are moral principles that apply across all cases. The generalist 
                                                
9 Though she might give reasons that support her decision to act as she did. These reasons will not appeal to 
principles, but simply cite features of the situation that warranted responding kindly (e.g. he was suffering, she was 
in need of comfort, etc.). Thanks to David Bakhurst for pointing this out to me.  
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holds that such principles are grounded in the fact that certain properties always have the same 
moral relevance in whatever situation they appear in.  So under the generalist stance, the fact that 
an action of the kind stealing is stealing, always involves a wrong-making characteristic and this 
underlies the moral principle that “stealing is wrong”.  
In contrast to generalism, Dancy argues that considerations that constitute a reason for 
action in one case may not function in the same way elsewhere. He writes, “That an action is fun 
is a reason in favour of doing it – normally. But sometimes it is a reason against” (Dancy 1993, 
61). He cites a quote by a British Labour politician Roy Hattersley delivered on April 21st 1990 
in the Guardian: 
I have long supported whoever it was who said that the real objection to foxhunting is the 
pleasure that the hunters get out of it … If killing foxes is necessary for the safety and 
survival of other species, I – and several million others – will vote for it to continue. But 
the slaughter ought not to be fun. (Dancy 1993, 61) 
 
In this case, the fact that foxhunting is fun does not function the same way fun usually does as a 
reason for action. In fact, that one finds it fun to foxhunt is seen as a reason against foxhunting. 
In some cases, it seems permissible to treat an action’s being fun as a reason to do it. However, 
in other cases, something being fun figures as a reason against. In short, Dancy holds that 
particularism is the stronger theory in contrast to generalism because a reason here is unable to 
explain whether or not it will be a reason elsewhere.  
 The role Dancy ascribes to moral principles are simply set as reminders for the 
importance a property can have in suitable circumstances (Dancy 1993, 67). For instance, the 
principle ‘lying is morally wrong’ reminds us of the moral relevance that lying can have in 
certain familiar circumstances, but that’s the only role Dancy thinks the principle should play. 
Principles cannot determine right action. 
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 A moral agent cannot therefore rely on principles to decide for her what to do: she is the 
one who must judge. Her judgement must assess the weight of various reasons calling for action. 
If she is to decide whether or not to it is morally permissible to push a fat man over the bridge to 
stop a trolley on course to kill five people, she must assess the various weight of reasons that call 
for her to act in one way rather than the other. For example, a reason not to push the fat man may 
be that she would be using him as a means to an end, whereas a reason to do so may be the 
prospect of saving five people. These reasons must be assessed given their relevant weight – i.e. 
how salient they are given the specific character of her circumstances, her character and moral 
outlook.  
 Hence, what is characteristic of the moral agent is that her judgement must be sensitive to 
the particular character of the circumstances at hand. These circumstances differ from one 
context to the next, and the agent’s actions respond accordingly to the salient features of the case 
at hand. She responds accordingly by weighing and assessing the reasons she has for producing 
an action or inaction. In other words, she judges intuitively on a case-by-case basis.  
 
Commonalities between Intuitionism, Virtue, and Particularism 
There are four characteristics relevant to intuition as discussed by the philosophers in this 
chapter. The first is that intuition is shown to be exercised in the making of judgement. The 
agent’s judgement includes an intuitional aspect. That is to say, when she forms her judgement, a 
feature of her judging is that it is done intuitively.  
 Intuition in this sense is different from that discussed in chapter one. This brings us to the 
second characteristic: intuitive judgement expresses the agent’s knowledge. Her intuitive 
judgement is an expression of her apprehension or understanding of the matter at hand. Whether 
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it be her self-evident grasping, her reliable sensibilities, or her assessment of the various reasons 
in play and their weight, she is in a position where she apprehends or understands the situation. 
 But what can we say of her judgement? In all cases, her intuitive judgement appears to 
resist codification. There are no rules which tell her how to act or how to judge. Each scenario 
she comes across involves her being able attend to the salient features of the situation and being 
able to act or judge accordingly. This judging or action involves using her intuition and her 
deliverance cannot be codified. What her intuition calls for will differ from case to case, hence 
resisting codification. 
 Lastly, we can say that when the agent judges intuitively, she does so with an approach 
that takes into consideration the context in its entirety. One can say that her intuition is context-
sensitive. The thought being that her intuitive judgement is one that is done with a sort of 
attunement to the various features of a situation. When she judges that she should not lie to her 
friend, she does so by taking into consideration all the relevant factors that makes her choice an 
appropriate one. She is said to have a context-sensitive judgement.  
 
Intuition in Teaching 
While intuition, understood as an essential feature of judgement, is prominent in moral 
philosophy, this is not the only domain in which it figures. There are other areas outside of 
philosophy that describe intuition in the way we describe it here. In particular, intuition is 
sometimes portrayed in a similar way in educational contexts.  
Thorbjörn Johansson and Tomas Kroksmark (2004) conducted empirical studies that 
identify intuition in teachers as “intuition-in-action” as opposed to what they call “reflection-in-
action”. The difference lies in what teachers do. Reflection-in-action is described as a type of 
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reflection that aids what the teacher knows, is aware of, and is liberated from (Johansson and 
Kroksmark 2004, 377). In contrast, intuition-in-action is more immediate or direct – i.e. when 
one intuits one is able to take in a situation in its entirety without any type of reflection occurring 
(Johansson and Kroksmark 2004, 377). Although these are just general characterizations of 
intuition and reflection, teachers can both be said to intuit and reflect in the course of their 
practice.  
When the authors conducted qualitative interviews with the teachers concerning their 
practice, they noticed a trend: the teachers would explain their practice in terms of intuition-in-
action rather than reflection-in-action (Johansson and Kroksmark 2004, 357). Here are a few 
statements from some of the teachers describing their practice: 
Yes [...] let’s see [...] Yes sometimes when you hit right, there is something and [...] and 
you try to explain. Then suddenly you get hit by some kind of brain-wave, right! Ah! I’ll 
explain it like this. First you might think it comes barging in from nowhere, that you just 
happened to take that picture or that example. To me, just then, it feels something like 
where on earth did I get that idea? It came out of nowhere, yet I still believe I had it in 
me, either because I had done it long ago or because I had read about it somewhere or [...] 
because somehow have thought about this previously. And then it sits there and I find it 
at that very moment. I don’t believe it drops down from above, you know. Some kind of 
flash of genius. Though at the time I have no idea where I got it from. (VSK 100)  
 
You feel this [...] more or less like having antennae or tentacles out feeling the 
surrounding. Later, however, you can probably learn to be more sensitive or to open up 
your eyes to what happens around you, not to focus on yourself but to be extremely 
outgoing. (LH 146)  
 
You can have an idea, a plan of what you have thought and so [...] when you are sitting 
there with the group, the conversation takes a different direction than the one you’d 
planned, but [...] You might jump at it right away when you see there is a possibility, that 
there is something they recognize, something they have done before and then you go for 
it. (JM 136) (Johansson and Kroksmark 2004). 
 
There are a few things to take from these interviews:  
(1)  Intuition appears to be characteristic of a teacher’s practice and; 
(2)  Intuition, as opposed to reflection, seems to be more prevalent in teachers’ 
descriptions of their practice.  
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(3)  The teachers’ intuition shares the same characteristics as those expressed in the 
ethical-intuitionist tradition.  
 
To briefly comment on the third point, both the teacher and the agent judge in such a way that 
makes the use of intuition essential. The judgement is said to express knowledge, rather than 
figure as evidence for some conclusion to be drawn by other means. The basis of the judgement 
cannot be codified. This provides one with reason to conclude that intuitive judgement is 
practical rather than evidential. The reason being that the teacher or agent judges what to do or 
how to act. And this is not evidence for or against a theory, rather it is doing or acting in light of 
reasons for what there is to do or how to act.  
 
Problems with Intuitive Judgement 
So far, so good. We have been able to establish that there is another form of intuition that figures 
prominently in and outside of philosophy. This form of intuition is one that is constitutive of a 
judgement. Also, it appears to serve a practical role. But from this, one may raise two objections 
or worries concerning its role.  
The first worry is metaphysical. In the moral case, we are told that intuition can disclose 
to us what the morally right course of action is.  But what kind of thing is moral rightness?  In 
the case of a natural property, such as mass or shape, we know exactly what is involved in 
determining whether something has that property, but the case of moral rightness is very 
different.  We cannot point to the properties of rightness in an agent’s action and say “there it 
is!”. Does the notion of intuition really help illuminate this problem?  Or is it rather that, 
operating with a metaphysically strange view of rightness as a peculiar property of “ought-to-be-
doneness”, we find ourselves positing “intuition” as the means by which we grasp the presence 
of this strange property.  But this just explains the strange by the even stranger.  
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 The second worry is epistemological. It arises from the fact that moral agents often 
disagree on what the right course of action is. If we cannot determine the rightness or goodness 
of an act except by appeal to intuition, then how are we able to verify our disputes concerning 
the issue? In a case where morally adept agents disagree about what to do can all that be said is 
simply that they have different intuitions?    
 Objections of this kind have long been made against intuitionism (see Warnock 1967). If 
intuition is supposed to enable us to discern moral properties and their significance for action, are 
we not positing a realm of mysterious non-natural normative properties and an equally 
mysterious technique for determining their presence and relevance? (Frankena 1963, 86-87). 
Why should we posit these non-natural normative properties if we can make sense of this 
phenomena in simpler and more natural terms? 
McDowell and Dancy would strongly resist this interpretation, arguing that there is 
nothing mysterious in the idea that moral knowledge is non-codifiable and involves sensitivity to 
the salient features of particular cases.  After all, those features are not mysterious: that she is in 
pain, that it would be stealing, that it would embarrass him, that it was disloyal… are all morally-
relevant properties that can constitute reasons for action.  We do not need special powers to 
discern such properties and why they matter, or so they argue (and this is why McDowell and 
Dancy deliberately avoid using the term “intuition”, with its connotations of mystery).   
 McDowell and Dancy insist that their views do not saddle us with dubious metaphysics 
and epistemology.  For all that, however, neither of them does much to help us make sense of the 
distinctive kind of judgement involved in moral decision-making.  We are still left appealing to 
the concept of intuition or something like it.  In the next chapter, I attempt to provide a fuller 




Chapter III: A Framework for Understanding Intuition 
How to Understand Intuitive Judgement 
How should we understand all this? At the conclusion of the last chapters, worries were raised 
about the metaphysical and epistemic status of intuitive judgement. In this section, I propose to 
resolve these worries by developing a conception of intuition as a form (or expression) of tacit 
knowledge. The hope is to understand intuition as having a less “mysterious” nature and a more 
explanatory role.  
Michael Polanyi sums up tacit knowledge in a phrase: “we can know more than we can 
tell” (1967, 4, emphasis in original). He gives the example of people attempting to convey 
information about a criminal’s profile to police authorities. The people provide descriptive 
information such as the individual having a big nose, wrinkled forehead, large ears, and so on, 
but this description does not convey the knowledge the people have that enable them to 
recognize how the criminal looks. How they are able to recognize the criminal’s profile is a type 
of information that cannot be captured from what they strictly report. Tacit knowledge is just this 
– knowledge of something over and above what we are able to express in a report or telling. If 
our knowledge is something more than we can tell, this implies that it is not exhausted by our 
possession of propositional knowledge but involves a richer conception of what can be known. 
Hence, intuition in the tacit sense is a form of knowledge over and above the knowledge we can 
report. It is characterized as a state in which we know without necessarily being able to express 
that knowledge in propositional form. 
It seems clear that the kind of intuition at work in moral judgement, and in the case of the 
teachers discussed in the last chapter, is a type of tacit knowledge. In the educational case, the 
teacher draws on tacit knowledge about how best to present material to the students so that they 
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should understand it.  The teacher is not acting out of an appreciation of a codified pedagogical 
method. Teachers may be unable to explain why they chose to present the material as they did.  
In some cases, the knowledge they seek to convey may itself be uncodifiable so that the student 
grasps what is being conveyed in a way that requires more than just believing in propositions and 
facts. In the moral case, the agent expresses her knowledge of what is to be done through her 
ability to grasp, and assess accordingly, what she has reason to do. Tacit knowledge is implied 
without being stated – it is embodied. Intuition is a form of tacit knowledge that is embodied by 
the teacher or moral agent and directs itself at the case in a way that expresses knowledge that 
cannot be articulated merely in propositional form.  
 In a game of chess, there are certain rules – e.g. knights move in an L-shape, bishops 
move diagonally, and so on – but the game of chess requires more than just knowing the rules 
that can be expressed propositionally. The players are required to understand how to play the 
game and this is not captured by simply being aware of or following the rules. Intuition as a type 
of tacit knowing aims at conveying this knowledge. It’s how one embodies a type of knowing or 
how one carries oneself in such a way as to understand the profile of a situation.  
 Thus, from what has been said, we can describe the characteristics of intuition as an 
expression of tacit knowledge. The first is that it is personal and embodied. Tacit knowledge is 
contextual knowledge that depends on the details of the circumstance the knower is situated in. 
The second characteristic is that the knowledge in question cannot be fully expressed in a report 
or telling: it cannot be codified. There are no general rules or principles which the knowledge 
arises from or adheres to.  
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Competing Conceptions of Tacit Knowledge 
Given this characterization of tacit knowledge, how are we able to understand it? According to 
Neil Gascoigne and Tim Thornton, three competing principles bear on our understanding of the 
nature and possibility of tacit knowledge: 
Principle of Codification (PC): All knowledge can be fully articulated, or codified, in context-  
     independent terms. 
Principle of Inarticulacy (PI): There can be knowledge that cannot be articulated. 
Principle of Articulacy (PA): All knowledge can be articulated, either in context-independent   
     terms or in context-dependent terms. (2013, 16) 
 
Concerning PC: The idea is simply that all knowledge can be captured in descriptions in 
objective terms. Your knowing the train departs in the morning can be reduced to your standing 
in an appropriate relation to the fact that the train departs in the morning, full stop. This can be 
articulated and codified. That is to say, we are able to express the knowledge clearly in a report 
or telling. That we know x implies that what we know can be articulated or codified in terms 
independent of a subject. Though we are able to express our knowledge in context-dependent 
terms, all instances of knowledge are able to be captured in context-independent or objective 
terms. This is said to follow from the nature of knowledge itself.  If tacit knowledge is a type of 
knowledge, then under this principle, all instances of tacit knowing are in fact able to be 
expressed in context-independent terms either through articulation or codification.  
 Concerning PI: The idea is that there is some knowledge that cannot be articulated. 
Applying the principle to tacit knowledge, the thought is that what is tacitly known cannot be 
articulated clearly in a report or telling. Here is an example.10 Imagine players of a soccer team 
teasing each about their performance and their abilities. In this case, teasing can be a way to 
strengthen bonds over a game they love and cherish. When one player teases another, they do so 
                                                
10 The example of one’s ability to tease as involving tacit knowledge will be developed in the next section. Thanks 
to David Bakhurst for bringing up this example during our regular discussions.  
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with the knowledge that it is done in a certain way. You tease at certain times, with certain 
intentions, and a certain approach. But someone who is good at such friendly teasing knows 
when such teasing is welcome and when such teasing threatens to “overstep the mark” and risk 
offending the person being teased.  This knowledge, however, cannot be articulated. There is no 
general principle that tells you how and when to tease, and when to back off.  This looks like a 
good example of tacit knowledge.  Thus, there is some knowledge that cannot be articulated and 
the status of tacit knowledge conforms to this description.  
 Concerning PA: The thought is that if something is knowledge then it can be expressed 
either in propositional context-independent terms or articulated in other context-dependent ways. 
The reason being that if it is to be considered knowledge, it must somehow be expressible or 
transferable.  Knowledge must be expressible via one of these means, and tacit knowledge takes 
the latter route. An example of a way for what is tacitly known to be articulated in context-
dependent terms is to point out that that is a way to ride a bike. Regarding knowing how to ride a 
bike, one needs to be situated in the context. In addition, one needs to be able to recognize that 
that is a way to ride by employing demonstrative concepts. This example is supposed to capture 
the idea that tacit knowledge can be articulated.  
 
So What’s the Status of Tacit Knowledge? 
Which principle best captures the true nature of tacit knowledge? In this section, I will argue that 
PI correctly captures the status of tacit knowing. I will provide reasons for why PC and PA do 
not get things right. My main contention will be to focus more on defending PI from PA since it 
is the latter that Gascoigne and Thornton endorse in their book Tacit Knowledge. But first, let us 
 49 
consider an example in which a person is said to clearly possess tacit knowledge. This is the 
example mentioned above of the soccer players who tease one another.    
Case 1 
Imagine some players of a soccer team, Johnny, Jimmy and Jimbo arrive early to the field 
to practice their shots. While warming up, each team member comments on the other’s 
performance. They say things like “Literally, that shot was out of this world!”, “The net 
is over here”, “Going, going, and it’s gone…”. They communicate by teasing one another 
about their abilities to shoot on target. They tease not to annoy each other, but to bond 
over the game and strengthen their ties.  
 
Now imagine a slightly different case: 
Case 2 
Johnny, Jimmy and Jimbo are members of a soccer team that arrive early on the field to 
practice their shots. While warming up, each team member comments on the other’s 
performance. They say things like “Literally, that shot was out of this world!”, “The net 
is over here”, “Going, going, and it’s gone…”. Jerry, a new team member, arrives five 
minutes after. He sees that his teammates are teasing one another and decides to join in. 
He says things like “Woah, where was that going?”, “What a bad shot!”. The three other 
teammates do not appreciate his comments and think they are out of place. They take 
Jerry’s comments to be annoying, rude, and targeted.  
 
Here we have two cases: the first in which the members of the team – i.e. Johnny, Jimmy and 
Jimbo – are said to possess knowledge of how to tease and the second in which Jerry does not 
possess knowledge of how to tease. In the former case, the members of the team know when it is 
appropriate to comment in certain ways at certain times. In the latter case, Jerry does not know 
when it is appropriate to comment in certain ways at certain times. He is not attuned to the 
various considerations that call for teasing.  
 In what sense is the knowledge in question tacit? Well, knowledge of how to tease is 
personal. It is embodied by the subject, and such embodiment illustrates that one grasps 
knowledge of how to tease. The idea is that if knowledge is personal, then the person is in 
possession of knowledge – i.e. a state of knowing. If the person knows, then they possess 
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knowledge and this is just to say that he or she understands or grasps the relevant knowledge. 
Also, one’s knowledge of teasing is implied without being stated. When one teases, one does not 
act in light of rules that dictate how to tease. The knowledge is unable to be expressed clearly in 
a description. From here, let us examine the three principles and see what they imply concerning 
the categorization of the instance teasing as a form of tacit knowing. 
 
Against PC 
Let us attend to PC (all knowledge can be codified in context-independent terms) first. Defenders 
of this view are of the intellectualist tradition. They think that knowledge-how is reducible to 
knowledge-that. Knowledge how to get from Point A to Point B is expressible in terms of 
knowledge that this is a way to get from Point A to Point B. For example, my knowledge of how 
to get from Toronto to Niagara Falls can be expressed in context-free terms: taking the highway 
is a way to go from Toronto to Niagara Falls. This knowledge is clearly expressed 
propositionally and is independent of contextual factors.  
 However, while there is knowledge that is reducible to descriptions, not all knowledge is 
like this. In what way can we express or codify our knowledge of teasing in context-independent 
terms? Knowledge of teasing does not submit to any clearly articulated and non-circular rules or 
codes of conduct. While we may gesture at cues or hints of what teasing might involve, this is 
not independent of the context. One must be situated in the context in order to see what’s going 
on. Knowing how to tease resists codification, hence making PC false. PC is too narrow of a 




By examining PC in relation to the case of teasing, we were able to notice that knowledge of 
how to tease resists codification. PA (all knowledge can be articulated in context-dependent or 
context–independent terms) does not commit itself to the view that all knowledge must be 
codified. It may or may not be the case that knowledge can be codified (Gascoigne and Thornton 
think that some knowledge can, but not all), but what really matters is whether all knowledge can 
be articulated. Well, what does this mean? The term is ambiguous and it will be my aim here to 
clarify the various meanings articulation can have, with an emphasis on understanding how 
Gascoigne and Thornton employ it. 
 In her review of Gascoigne and Thornton’s Tacit Knowledge, Zhenhua Yu differentiates 
two meanings the term articulation can have. Articulation can refer to linguistic articulation or 
practical articulation (Yu 2015, 303). When one refers to the former, one embraces a narrow 
conception of articulation; when one refers to both the former and the latter, one embraces a 
broad conception of articulation. When Gascoigne and Thornton refer to articulation, they mean 
to employ the broad conception. It is made evident by what they say: 
The equation of ‘personal’ and ‘practical’ flags the fact that such knowledge can only be 
articulated practically and from within [i.e. the personal/embodied aspect]. It requires not 
just a context, which would be sufficient for context-dependent spectator knowledge, but 
also a skilled agent both to perform the practical demonstration (in the role of the teacher) 
and also to have ‘eyes to see’ the import of the demonstration (as the ‘learning-ready’ 
pupil). (Gascoigne and Thornton 2013, 167) 
 
Thus the truth of Polanyi’s slogan is that one knows more than one can put into words 
without the aid of one’s environment and one’s skills, whether bodily or not. With that 
aid, however, what one knows can be articulated. ...Tacit knowledge is a species of the 
genus of knowledge without being either an instance of context-independent knowledge-
that nor even context-dependent knowledge-that [i.e. irreducible to descriptions]. Its 
articulation—what a subject with it knows—is also practical. There is no prospect of a 
reduction of it in favour of either form of theoretical knowledge. (Gascoigne and 
Thornton 2013, 191) 
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Employing demonstratives within a context where the subject possesses knowledge is supposed 
to capture the broad conception of articulation. For example, when one states that that is a way to 
tease in a context where teasing takes place, it is supposed to capture the idea that what is being 
articulated is something practical done in a linguistic manner. One’s pointing to the case is a 
demonstration of articulating the knowledge of how to tease.  
 But, according to Gascoigne and Thornton, tacit knowledge as practical knowledge 
cannot be reduced to either “context independent knowledge-that” or “context dependent 
knowledge-that” because what is known implies practical articulation. What PA refers to 
concerns articulation either in context-independent or context-dependent terms. But if tacit 
knowledge as practical knowledge cannot be reduced to context-dependent or independent terms, 
then such knowledge violates PA rendering it false.  
 How is it that what Gascoigne and Thornton embrace ends up actually misfiring? The 
first point to take notice of is that what the authors embrace does not necessarily imply what they 
actually state. The second point stems from the first in that the gap from what they embrace to 
what they state depends on a subtlety. The subtlety being that the conception of articulation 
employed in PA is linguistic articulation whereas what they actually embrace is both linguistic 
and practical articulation. This is supported by the way in which they discuss articulation in 
terms of PC. In PC, articulation refers to whether or not one is able to express what they know in 
terms of descriptions. It would be rather odd if the authors referred to different types of 
articulation in all three principles since it would make their categorizations inconsistent and of no 




What does articulation refer to in PI (there is knowledge that cannot be articulated)? Yu notes 
that it could be either linguistic or practical articulation that is at issue (2015, 304). Because 
Gascoigne and Thornton dismiss PI, I am inclined to assume that they intend it refers to practical 
as well as linguistic articulation. Under this interpretation, PI is false because there is knowledge 
that can be articulated through action (e.g. the teasing case). But, if we take articulation in PI to 
refer to practical articulation, then we would be committing the fallacy of equivocation. In PC 
and PA, we would be referring to linguistic articulation, whereas in PI we would be referring to 
practical articulation. It would be inconsistent to have two conceptions of articulation at play 
when discussing the three principles.  
 Instead, articulation in PI should refer to linguistic articulation so as to not commit the 
fallacy. But if we amend what articulation refers to in PI, then it turns out to be true. PI would 
state that there is knowledge that cannot be linguistically articulated. In the teasing case, such 
knowledge cannot be conveyed clearly in a report or telling. What it is for someone to know how 
to tease is not something expressible or articulable in language. Hence, there is some knowledge, 
namely, tacit knowledge that cannot be articulated, making PI true.   
 But in what sense is tacit knowledge knowledge? If the knowledge cannot be 
linguistically articulated, then how is one able to transfer knowledge from one subject to 
another? The solution lies in the kind of knowledge it is. Tacit knowledge being practical may 
not be transferred neatly via language. While this is true, this does not mean it cannot be 
transferred or expressed, full stop. Instead, tacit knowledge is expressed or transferred via 
practical means. The agent must be situated in the context and shown how to behave so that, if 
all goes well, she grasps what to do or how to act in light of the reasons for action.  
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 So to sum up, the way we characterized intuition as a form of tacit knowledge connects to 
the status of tacit knowledge as conforming to PI – there is knowledge that cannot be 
linguistically articulated. We used the teasing case as an instance of tacit knowledge and 
examined the three principles in relation to how well they captured its characteristics. PC is too 
narrow a conception to capture the characteristics of knowing how to tease because it relies on 
being able to articulate knowledge in context-independent terms. PA turns out to be false under a 
reading that refers to articulation as linguistic. In turn, we learned that PI turns out to be true 
under the same reading of articulation as linguistic. Hence, while PC and PA are too narrow to 
capture the notion of tacit knowledge, PI turns out to be apt.   
 
Applying the Conception of Intuition as Tacit Knowledge 
We now have a handle on what it means for intuition to be an expression of tacit knowledge. 
How does this conception of intuition relate to the different roles intuition has in philosophical 
inquiry? We noted two prominent roles:  
(1)  Intuition used as evidence for or against philosophical theories and; 
(2)  Intuition as a constitutive feature of a judgement. 
 
Concerning (1): If intuition is an expression of tacit knowledge, then, at first sight, it appears to 
be in tension with its role as evidential. If my intuition in the Gettier case that Smith does not 
know he’ll get the job is understood as knowledge, then my intuition does not need to be used as 
evidence for or against any philosophical theory. By default, having knowledge puts you in a 
state of knowing such and such to be the case. In contrast, evidence does not require or assume 
you have knowledge of what is the case, but rather aims to establish what is the case. Evidence 
aims to lend support to the conclusion. So, what gives? If intuition is an expression of tacit 
knowledge, then why is it being treated as evidence for or against philosophical theories? 
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 The solution lies in the attitude one has towards intuitions. My intuition that Smith does 
not know he’ll get the job is not evidence that Smith does not know he’ll get the job; it is an 
expression of my knowledge that Smith does not know he’ll get the job. Whether my knowledge 
of Smith not knowing he’ll get the job is used as evidence for or against a philosophical theory is 
secondary to what my intuition is an expression of, namely, tacit knowledge. If we are to use 
intuitions as evidence, then this comes after the fact that they are expressions of tacit knowledge.   
 However, it is important that our judgements are fallible.  That is, sometimes we think we 
have knowledge when we don’t. So when I judge that p in a way that seems to draw on tacit 
knowledge, if all goes well, then my judgement does indeed reflect knowledge.  But sometimes, 
I may make such a judgement and be wrong in which case I either don’t have the knowledge I 
think I have, or I don’t deploy it properly (e.g. I may know how to tease someone appropriately, 
but make an error, misjudging the situation, or their character, or whatever).  Because we are 
fallible it can be interesting to consider what people think they know by asking them to make 
judgements in hypothetical cases.11   
In addition to being used as evidence (a secondary role), intuitions need to be supplanted 
with other relevant data and should not be used as standalone data points. This is due to the 
nature of what they are supposed to be evidence for – i.e. philosophical theories. Theories are not 
supported simply by intuitions; there are other relevant sources for their truth. For example, 
empirical data, consistency, external applicability, etc. Thus, while the conception of intuition as 
tacit knowledge appeared to conflict with its role as evidence for or against philosophical 
theories, the worry is resolved by changing our attitude towards what they reveal to us. It is only 
                                                
11 This is interesting because some contemporary philosophers’ pessimistic attitude towards intuitional reliability 
arises from the way in which a judgement can go wrong. Thanks to David Bakhurst for clarifying the fallibility of 
intuition.  
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when we see its evidential role as secondary that we are able to make sense of the phenomena of 
what it is evidence for.  
Concerning (2): Where intuition is an expression of tacit knowledge, then my judging 
that p is knowledge that p. The reason being that intuition is a constitutive feature of one’s 
judgement and the judgement is exercise of one’s knowledge of what to do or how to act in light 
of reasons for action. Knowledge is exhibited in the practice. For example, when I tease, my 
knowledge of how to tease is exhibited in the practice of teasing. My ability is exercised in the 
practice and it is said that my actions are an expression of my knowledge how to tease. The idea 
is that when I intuitively judge, my judging is an expression of my tacit knowledge. The 
knowledge is situated in the context and is expressed accordingly. It is non-codifiable and 
irreducible to descriptions. So, intuitions as an expression of tacit knowledge accords well with 
its role as being a feature of a judgement because what the judgement expresses is knowledge 




We started off this thesis by attempting to understand what intuition is, what it’s doing, and its 
relation to philosophical inquiry. At first, we introduced intuition skepticism and the worries it 
raised about our intuitions being diverse and sensitive to irrelevant factors. The worries 
concerned whether or not we can trust our intuitions. In other words, are they reliable? This 
posed what Alexander calls the restrictionist challenge: 
The real challenge lies not just in the fact that intuitions are not wholly reliable, but also 
in the fact that we know so little about them. We lack the resources needed to explain 
problematic intuitional sensitivity and, in return, struggle to understand its dimensions, to 
identify strategies for how to compensate for it, and to predict where it will appear. What 
is really needed, then, is a general, systematic understanding of philosophical intuitions. 
By coming to better understand what intuitions are, where they come from, and what 
factors influence them, we can better understand what role they play in philosophical 
practice. (2012, 71-72) 
 
I believe we are now in a position to respond accordingly. There are two items I want to address: 
what the challenge has to say about the nature of intuitions; and its proposed solution to 
understanding them. In regards to the nature of intuitions, the challenge states that they are 
unreliable due the fact that they are diverse and sensitive to factors we would otherwise not want 
them to be. For example, the way I frame one alternative over the other will affect the way in 
which I make my decision.  
We can go two routes here. I can say that I find it hard to believe that we would not want 
our intuitions to be sensitive or diverse to these factors. Of course, if someone frames something 
in one way that makes it more prone to being chosen over another, then our intuitions will be 
sensitive to such factors. But in what sense are they irrelevant? It seems to matter to the case at 
hand that one alternative was framed in such a way as to be more appealing than the other. Our 
intuitions should be sensitive to such effects, but in no way does this entail that the factors are 
irrelevant.  
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 The other route is to say that of course our intuitions will be influenced by irrelevant 
factors, but this does not mean that we cannot rely on them. Granting that we may lack resources 
to explain the sensitivity,12 we may still remedy the sensitivity by attending to the particular 
situation at hand in more careful detail. We need to pay more attention to the case and assess 
accordingly.  
 In regards to the proposed solution the challenge offers, namely, needing a “general, 
systematic understanding of philosophical intuitions”, I think this is misplaced. The reason being 
that intuitions are an expression of one’s tacit knowledge. The characteristics of tacit knowledge 
is such that it is personal/embodied and irreducible to descriptions. This implies that our 
intuitions express something that is contextual and non-codifiable. To suggest that we can 
systematize our intuitions into a general category is to mistake the very nature of our intuitions. 
They resist codification and the knowledge they express is personal.  
If intuition is a form of tacit knowledge, then there will be knowledge incapable of 
expression in propositional form. Similar to how a description of what it takes to ride a bike is 
insufficient – or at times unnecessary – to know how to ride a bike, a description of what makes 
things right may be insufficient or unnecessary to know what makes thing right. Hence, the 
defender of intuitive judgement need not be in a position to describe what makes an action right 
in order to get things right13; all that is required is that they get the action right.  
 If we understand intuition as being an expression of tacit knowledge, then we do not need 
to posit an extravagant explanation of how we come to know things. It is not that there are these 
mysterious normative properties or conceptions out there in the world, inaccessible to us. Rather, 
                                                
12 Although I have argued that if we understand intuition as an expression of tacit knowledge, we are in a better 
position to make sense of intuitional sensitivity. 
13 Though he or she may articulate reasons for action. 
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the knowledge intuition expresses just is incapable of being reduced to descriptions. Being an 
expression of tacit knowledge, intuition resists codification. Does this make the knowledge it 
expresses mysterious? No. Athletes often cannot express how they know how to make certain 
plays, but this does not make their knowledge of the game some sort of mystery. It is with 
experience that they attain their knowledge and this knowledge cannot be neatly expressed in 
propositional form. Likewise, one’s intuition expresses tacit knowledge, and this knowledge 
should not pose a mystery. All that can be said of it is that it is irreducible to descriptions.  
 So how does intuition get things right? Well, this relies on experience. The agent’s 
intuition is reliable due to her experience. She is said to respond accordingly to whatever reason 
calls for. Does this mean that she always gets things right? The answer is no. Our intuitions are 
fallible. While we may apprehend or understand what a situation calls for, we may also pay 
attention to various factors that are irrelevant. We may also weigh the right sort of reasons in a 
deficient or an excessive manner. In the second case, while our target is right, the focus may be 
too weak or too strong. It is part of what it means to intuit, reason, or see that we are able to 
situate ourselves in the field of variability and aim to respond accordingly. 
 So why is it beneficial and useful to understand intuition as an expression of tacit 
knowledge? Well as we’ve highlighted it sheds light on its nature. It’s not some sort of 
mysterious phenomenon that we posit because we cannot explain it in natural terms. Providing a 
reason to not tease someone because it will hurt his or her feelings is just as natural as descriptive 
properties such as the grass having greenness.  
 It also explains intuition’s role in philosophical inquiry (and other similar domains) as a 
type of knowledge. The fact that it is knowledge means that our attitudes towards them should 
change. We should not treat them merely as curious facts; instead, we should take them more 
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seriously because they are an expression of knowledge. Therefore, we should alter our 
philosophical treatment of intuitions because what they express is knowledge and our attitudes 
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